The
so-called advanced societies are experiencing a period of value
disruptions. Thanks to some extraordinary technical advances
in communication and information and globalization, we can now
experience in real time, individually on the Internet and collectively
through television medias, the political events and natural
disasters that affect our daily lives and force us to rethink
our status a citizens in relation to the limits of our nationality.
And this happens while the development of education and the
globalization of markets, and their effects on the freedom of
the citizens (birth control and euthanasia are two examples
that spring to mind), allow everyone, everywhere, to access
information that were previously kept out of the reach of the
masses.
Moreover, global warming creates more and more
human and social problems that no nation will be able to solve
on its own, in a splendid isolation that would allow the rich
countries to ignore the poor. Whether we want it or not, we
are faced with a global geopolitical and human problematics
whose purview and processes, yet unknown and even unsuspected
by certain people, place us in a context that, not long ago,
ordinary psychiatry would have referred to as hallucination
and psychotic delusion. We are gradually losing the illusions
of a common perception of what is acceptable and of a collective
awareness of values. And everyday clinical practice based on
listening to the subject in psychosis ridicules this kind of
reference to delusion.
The time when psychiatry could be conceived
as the means used by a society to exercise control over socially
harmful or at best unproductive madness is over. We have imperceptibly
slipped into another problematics. As our societies, which are
increasingly dominated by the commercialization of health, tried
to control and treat, in individuals alone, the consequences
of a society choice, the consensus which supported that choice
crumbled. It is also undermined by a constant review of its
legal framework, under the influence of political and economical
struggles.
Democratic
states define the orientations and the administrative and financial
frameworks of the health services that will be offered to those
of their citizens who suffer from severe mental illness. Admittedly,
they are now introducing the concept of recovery as a desirable
objective of the care provided, but it is in relation to the orientations
and frameworks just mentioned that they ultimately evaluate these
services. The evaluation of mental health services based on the
objectives sought by the users is not yet a rule officially promoted.
The managers, the institutions, the research scientists and the
clinicians, we are constantly told, are under no obligation to
get results, but to use means, except when it comes to psychoanalysis,
of course.
The
networks of university research scientists in mental health
that are financially supported by the State or by private foundations,
study and promote care strategies, and practices and evaluation
methods with either sociological and anthropological problematics,
or biological and behavioral problematics. At the same time,
companies offer ready-to-use products by exercising a decisive
influence on the administration of the care and the financing
of the system. The State, the research scientists, the companies,
these three main agents of the network have very different objectives,
even when they get together to alleviate the consequences of
the tensions resulting from their conflicting interests. But
they all aim to provide care defined by factual data concerning
some strategic groups of patients. They necessarily agree on
care that are invariably the same for any group of patients
with similar characteristics.
Patient groups and associations of parents, relatives and friends
of persons suffering from serious mental illness, organizations
and community groups and the foundations that support them,
will become increasingly prominent as agents in the public health
networks. As citizens, they are applicants in relation to the
State, when it comes to the control and the management of public
services, but they are in the position of clients in relation
to the research scientists and the companies. They expect to
recruit the clinicians as allies in their quest for health and
a better life for the persons they love. As for the clinicians,
they may find themselves in the situation of hostages, bound
to programs, methods, rules and administrative, associative
and financial constraints that weaken or flatly block any practice
that doesn’t reduce the patient to an object to fix or
an organism to treat.
Despite
that framework in which the care are provided to the patients
without the providers knowing the real causes of their problems,
the living environment and the health conditions of those who
suffer from serious and persistent mental problems have remarkably
improved. Whatever critics and legitimate dissatisfactions can
be associated with these services, there is no doubt that they
bring hope to these people, and to their families and relations,
compared to what offered to them fifteen years ago. For many,
however, this progress remains superficial compared to what
the discourse of neurosciences and genetics allow to expect.
In
that general context and given the constraints imposed by the
integration into a public network, a profound renewal of psychoanalytical
practices and clinic must today urgently reconsider the issue
of the treatment of psychoses as an offer made to the psychotic
subject. That offer must take into account the main achievements
of today's psychiatry by rethinking them within a psychoanalytical
problematics in which the psychoanalytical treatment is the
axis of the therapy.
Such
an endeavor is not without risks, since it obvious as any critical
observer of the present and recent history of mental health
services will notice, that a serious problem runs through these
services. They are increasingly conceived and organized to respond
much more to the general requirements of public health networks
that to the requirements of a clinical practice based on individual
cases. The medicine that is taking shape before our eyes is
geared at care designed for groups of similar cases and to the
research that promotes it, individual cases remaining the exception
that are useful only to clarify the problems and obstacles encountered
by such a clinical practice. With its proposition of a clinical
practice aimed at individual cases, psychoanalysis finds itself
at odds with the practices of public health networks that are
more influenced by statistics, costs, and budgetary and administrative
consequences, as well as by media and political effects. The
objectives, the rules and the evaluation criteria of the practices
specific to the public network, centered on such a clinical
practice for groups and case-mixes, take precedence over the
results of a clinical practice dealing with individual cases.
Yet,
twenty years of clinical practice show that a personalized approach
of psychoses responds remarkably well to the expectations of
the persons suffering from such problems and their entourage,
with a different effectiveness and different results. The war
on psychoanalysis, seen as a useless or even dangerous approach,
nevertheless goes on. However, in Quebec, it tends to go nowhere,
as it holds as its main argument that psychoanalysis is not
based on proven data. Such an argument may however apply to
a problematics of research and care practices centered on a
medicine for client groups. The more personalized approaches,
such as the psychoanalytical treatment of psychoses, can now
pass the test of verifiable results that establish the relevancy
of practices that are proven and whose specific conditions and
logic must be studied.
Beyond
the results of an official evaluation ordered by the State,
which the detractors of psychoanalysis were hoping to use to
exclude it from the clinical field, the psychoanalytical treatment
of psychoses can report clinical practices that efficiently
helps psychotic patients re-enter social life as citizens. It
can account for the possibility to evaluate the results of more
personalized approaches of psychoses that re-open or keep open
the debate on various problematics of care and treatment, or
even on the difference between care and treatment in the field
of psychoses in particular.
The
dialogue between neurosciences and biological psychiatry, on
one hand, and psychoanalysis on the other, can re-center the
debate and stimulate research on both sides. It remains that,
for the ordinary patients and their entourage, the issue tends
more and more to be boil down to this: What can psychotics hope
for today? What can they hope for, between competent care aimed
at remediating their neurobiochemical or genetic deficiencies
while improving their life in society, and a treatment based
on an offer made to the subject to allow him to become aware
of his implication in what is happening to him and, with the
help of a multidisciplinary team, to take on the ethical responsibility
for his health?
A
conference devoted to this issue will allow for an in-depth
reflection and an open discussion on what supports and opposes
these two paths. The preoccupation for what brings them closer
can then only be better emphasized. Both have the same clients
whose expectations and requirements should guide our practice,
just like they question the positions taken by the public authorities.
We hope that the contribution of each side to the questions
addressed to its practice will turn this meeting into an important
event for psychotics and the people who help them in their quest.